

NEOPTOLEMUS AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY

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THE POETIC THEORY of Neoptolemus of Parion was discovered earlier in this century when C. Jensen, editor of the fifth book of Philodemus' *On Poems*, restored the name of Neoptolemus in the papyrus text. The name is quite certain; and it precedes a criticism of Neoptolemus' poetic theory in approximately three columns (cols. 10.32–13.28).¹ Before this, Neoptolemus enjoyed an obscure fame resting on Porphyrius's comment that Horace "gathered the most prominent precepts" of Neoptolemus' *Art of Poetry* in his *Ars Poetica*.² Jensen's discovery illuminated a small part of a lost area of Hellenistic thought; but it also proved puzzling. Philodemus shows that Neoptolemus divided the art of poetry into three parts: poet (*poietes*), poem (*poiema*), and poesy (*poiesis*).³ In the words of Philodemus: how could this be?

In this paper, I shall suggest that Neoptolemus' three divisions correspond to: the ability of the poet (*poietes*), and what may be called the "medium" (*poiema*) and the "message" (*poiesis*). This may be regarded as a distinction between poetic intent and execution. Neoptolemus' poetics has generally been thought to conform to a twofold distinction between poet and poetic craft, or between τεχνίτης (*artifex*) and τέχνη (*ars*).⁴ A great deal of evidence has been cited to show that this distinc-

Abbreviations: *GL* = H. Keil, ed., *Grammatici Latini*, 7 vols. (Leipzig, 1857–80); *RG* = C. Walz, ed., *Rhetores Graeci*, 9 vols. (Stuttgart, 1832–36); *RLM* = C. Halm, ed., *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig, 1863).

1. C. Jensen, ed. and tr., *Philodemus Über die Gedichte Fünftes Buch* (Berlin, 1923). Jensen's restoration of the name [Νεοπτόλεμος at col. 10.33 has been universally accepted; see C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry, Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 49–50. In this paper, I use Jensen's text except as indicated. A new edition of *On Poems* 5 has been prepared by C. Mangoni and will be published shortly in the series *La Scuola di Epicuro*, edited by M. Gigante. I am greatly indebted to Mangoni for allowing me to consult her new text. My changes in Jensen's text are based on her new readings, as well as on my own inspection of the papyrus. In addition to the papyrus, there exist two early copies, the Oxford copy (drawn before 1806) and the Naples copy (drawn between 1806 and 1811). The printed versions of both copies are reproduced in Jensen's edition.

2. Porphyrius on Horace *Ars Poetica* 1:162.6 Holder (= F 5 Mette): "in quem librum congegissit praecepta Neoptolemi τοῦ Παριανοῦ De arte poetica, non quidem omnia, sed eminentissima."

3. To avoid both archaism and confusion, I shall subsequently simply transliterate ποίησις (normally translated as "poetry") as *poiesis*. I shall also use the term "craft" interchangeably with "art."

4. This interpretation is based on E. Norden, "Die Composition und Literaturgattung der Horazischen Epistula ad Pisones," *Hermes* 40 (1905): 481–528. Norden divided Horace's *Ars Poetica* into two parts, the first (vv. 1–294) dealing with the craft of poetry, the second (vv. 295–476) with the poet; and he cited many examples of the distinction between craft and craftsman in ancient texts. When Jensen discovered Neoptolemus' name in *On Poems* 5, he proposed that Horace derived the twofold division from Neoptolemus (*Philodemus*, pp. 101, 104–5, 122–27). Jensen's assimilation of Neoptolemus' tripartite division to a

tion was widespread in antiquity; and indeed a distinction between craftsman and craft was commonplace. Neoptolemus' tripartite classification, however, does not fit this dichotomy: for he does not coordinate the "poet" with the craft; he subordinates him. Neoptolemus' division looks like an anomaly. In fact, I shall argue, it is not without parallel. It is a remarkably thoughtful attempt at a comprehensive view of the poetic craft, which may best be attributed to the Hellenistic Academy.

Philodemus' discussion of Neoptolemus is preserved in a single papyrus, PHerc. 1425, entitled "Philodemus' *On Poems* 5." Only the last part of the papyrus roll is intact. The columns on Neoptolemus are preserved as a whole, but with gaps of varying size in every line. Jensen originally believed that Philodemus also criticized Neoptolemus in an earlier section (frag. 2 to col. 9) of the papyrus. Later, Jensen identified the earlier opponent as Heraclides of Pontus, but he continued to assimilate Neoptolemus' position to that of Heraclides.⁵ This composite interpretation has had a wide influence and needs to be finally discarded.

Apart from the fragmentary condition of the text, what makes interpretation difficult is that Philodemus' discussion is entirely polemical. We may assume that Philodemus presented a systematic summary of Neoptolemus' theory earlier in his work.⁶ In the absence of such an exposition, Philodemus' criticism is often opaque. There is, however, some comfort. As far as Philodemus' objections can be made out, they are aimed with precision at clearly defined positions. Philodemus' polemical style can be annoying; but his objections are highly methodical and often incisive.

Other testimonies do not help us with Neoptolemus' poetic theory. They present Neoptolemus primarily as a "glossographer," who wrote extensively on the meanings of poetic words, especially Homeric words.⁷ Neoptolemus was himself a poet, composer of a *Dionysiad*.⁸ There is just one bit of information about his date. Eustathius mentions that Aristophanes of Byzantium (c. 257–180 B.C.) referred to a view of Neoptolemus.⁹ If this report is correct, Neoptolemus lived some time in the third century B.C.

twofold division has dominated the interpretation of Neoptolemus. Jensen is followed, among others, by K. Barwick, "Die Gliederung der Rhetorischen TEXNH und die Horazische Epistula ad Pisones," *Hermes* 57 (1992): 1–62, esp. 54; A. Rostagni, "Filodemo contro l'estetica classica," in *Scritti minori*, vol. 1 (Turin, 1955), pp. 394–448, esp. 418–20; id., *Arte poetica di Orazio* (Turin, 1930), p. lxxv; and Brink, *Prolegomena*, pp. 58–59. H. Dahlmann has shown that the distinction between craftsman and craft is not as prevalent as Norden believed ("Varros Schrift 'de poematis' und die hellenistisch-römische Poetik," *AAWM* [1953]: 89–158, esp. 105–11).

5. "Heraikleides von Pontus bei Philodem und Horaz," *SAWDDR* (1936): 292–320; see also Jensen, *Philodemos*, p. 126, n. 2.

6. PHerc. 228 contains partial summaries of Crates' theory (attacked in cols. 21–26 of book 5) and of the opinions criticized at the end of book 5. It is plausible, as Jensen conjectured, that this papyrus contained the first part of *On Poems* 5.

7. See esp. T 1 and F 12, H. J. Mette, "Neoptolemus von Parion," *RhM* 123 (1980): 1–24; see also Mette's article on Neoptolemus, in *RE*, vol. 16 (Stuttgart, 1935), cols. 2465–70.

8. F 1 Mette.

9. F 19 Mette.

In our text, Philodemus introduces Neoptolemus with an immediate attack. He charges that Neoptolemus wrongly separated verbal composition (τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς λέξεως) from thoughts (διανοήματα), claiming that the former “is in no way a smaller or greater [part]” than the latter.¹⁰ This charge is part of an ongoing debate whether diction (λέξις) or thought (διάνοια, or subject matter, πράγματα) is more important. Philodemus’ own view is that diction and thought cannot be separated from each other, and that thought is more important.¹¹ Philodemus appears to accuse Neoptolemus of making the verbal construct and the thoughts separate and coextensive.

After this initial attack, Philodemus scrutinizes the entire system of classification to which this separation belongs. We are surprised to discover that Neoptolemus divided the art of poetry into three εἶδη, “kinds” or (in technical language) “species”: poet, poem, and *poiesis*.

Col. 11.5–26:

5	ἀτόπως δ[ὲ] κα[ὶ] τὸν τὴν τέχνην [καὶ τὴν δύν]α- μιν ἔχοντα τ[ὴν ποι]ητι- κὴν εἶδος [π]αρίσ[τησι] τῆ[ς] τέ[χ]νης[ς] μ[ε]τὰ τοῦ	It is absurd of him to classify the person who has the poetic craft and ability as a species of the craft, alongside poem and
10	ποιήματο[ς] καὶ τῆς πο- ήσεως. [πῶ]ς δὲ καὶ ταῦ- τα; μᾶ[λλο]ν γὰρ ἐχρῆν τάς δια[θέσει]ς ποιήσεις ἐπικαλεῖ[ν], ἔτι δὲ βέλ-	<i>poiesis</i> . How can there be these [species]? For he ought rather to have called the dispositions <i>poieseis</i> ; or better still,
15	τιον ἔ[ρ]γα τὰ ποιήματα, τάς δὲ ποιήσεις οἷ[ον] ὕ- φη, πο[ι]ητῆ[ς] δὲ τὸν [τ]ὴν δύνα[μ]ιν ἔχοντα καὶ ἀ- πὸ ταύτης [ἐ]ργαζόμε-	[he should have called] the poems “works” and the <i>poieseis</i> something like “weavings,” and the person who has the ability and works from it “poet.”
20	νον. εἰ δ[ὲ] τ[ὴν] ἐργασίαν ποιητικὴν καλεῖ, τ[ῆ]ς τέχνης οὕτω προσ[αγο]- ρευομένης, ἀ[γ]νοε[ῖ], καὶ ταύτης εἶδος λέγειν	But if he calls the working [of poems and <i>poieseis</i>] “poetics,” when the craft is so called, he is ignorant.
25	τὸν [ποι]ητὴν καταγέ[λ]α[σ]- τον.	It is also ridiculous to say that the poet is a species of this.

This is an attack on the very foundations of Neoptolemus’ art of poetry. It is also a terminological battlefield. Before we turn to the distinction between *poiema* and *poiesis*, we need to consider an overriding problem, the use of the term εἶδος.¹² As a subdivision of a wider category, an εἶδος is

10. Cols. 10.32–11.2. Jensen’s text is: [Α]λλὰ / μὴν ὁ [γε Νεοπ]τόλεμος / οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔδοξε τὴν σύν/θεσιν [τῆς λέξε]ως τ[ὸν] / διανοη[μά]των χωρ[ί]ζε[ιν], οὐδὲν ἡ[ττω] μερίδα / λέγων αὐτῇ[ν] ἢ πλεῖ[ω], / καθάπερ ἐπενοή[σ]αμεν. The last two words may be a reference to Philodemus’ earlier summary of Neoptolemus’ poetics.

11. Philodemus states the issue in col. 9. Whereas he agrees with others that “diction and subject matter are similarly necessary” (col. 9.24–27), he holds that thoughts (νοήματα) have “greater efficacy” (κυριωτέραν δύναμιν) than diction (col. 32.6–10).

12. Apart from the two occurrences of εἶδος in the cited passage, the term occurs again at col. 12.28.

not only a “type” or “form” (as distinct from particular occurrences, or “tokens”), but also a “species” belonging to a genus.¹³ On the face of it, the division of the art of poetry, ποιητική, into the “species” of poet, poem, and *poiesis* makes no sense, just as Philodemus charges. Quite apart from the utter strangeness of classifying the poet as a species of his craft, it was commonplace to divide the art of poetry into “species” that are genres. For example, Aristotle begins his *Poetica* by listing epic, tragedy, comedy, and dithyrambic composition as “species” of the art.¹⁴

On the other hand, there is ample warrant for associating or identifying the poetic craft with either the “form” (εἶδος) of the craftsman (the “poet”) or the “form” of his product (the “poem” or *poiesis*). In his book *Orator ad M. Brutum*, Cicero proposes to set out the “form (species) of the perfect speaker and of consummate rhetoric.”¹⁵ Cicero here equates the craftsman with the craft on the basis of the commonplace definition of the craftsman as someone who has the craft.¹⁶ Aristotle and his followers explained that the craftsman imposes “form,” εἶδος, on a work as a result of having the form in his soul.¹⁷ Aristotle identifies the craft with this form; for example, the craft of medicine is identical with the form of health.¹⁸ Taking the Aristotelian view, one might define the craft as either a cognitive condition of the craftsman or a condition of the crafted product, and so equate the craft with either the craftsman or the crafted product.

There would be nothing unusual, then, about recognizing a “form” of poet, or a “form” of poem or *poiesis*, and identifying any or all of them with the craft of poetry. What is unusual about Neoptolemus’ classification is that he regards the three kinds as coordinate species of the craft. What reasons does he have for making these distinctions?

Philodemus tells us about the distinctions by attempting to correct them. After remarking on the absurdity of the tripartite division, Philodemus immediately proposes changes in Neoptolemus’ terminology without stopping to tell us how Neoptolemus himself used the terms. Presumably, Philodemus supplied this information earlier. Philodemus first suggests that the “dispositions” (διαθέσεις) should have been called *poieseis*. Then he has a better idea: the “poems” should have been called “works” and the *poieseis* something like “weavings” (ὕφη); moreover, the person who has the ability and works from it should have been called “poet.”¹⁹ Underlying

13. Against Jensen’s translation of εἶδος as “Gattung,” F. Zucker, “Zur Textherstellung und Erklärung von Philodems V. Buch *περί ποιημάτων*,” *Philologus* 82 (1927): 243–67, esp. 247–48, proposed the meaning “Bestandteil,” “element”; cf. Brink, *Prolegomena*, pp. 58–59. But εἶδος is never simply a “part” or “component” (see further below).

14. *Poet.* 1447a8–14.

15. *Orat.* 61: “*illius perfecti oratoris et summae eloquentiae species exprimenda est.*”

16. *Orat.* 101; cf. Cicero’s slide from the perfect speaker to the perfect craft at *Orat.* 7–10.

17. See esp. Arist. *Metaph.* 1032a32–b14; Sen. *Ep.* 65.4–14.

18. *Metaph.* 1032b13–14, 1034a24.

19. δια[θέσεις] (col. 11.13) is largely conjectural. However, Jensen was able to read part of Θ as C on the papyrus. No other term with the possible exception of δια[νοίας] could fit; and it is implausible that Philodemus would suggest identifying *poiesis* with “thoughts,” since he opposes the separation of language and thought. Philodemus’ corrections have been discussed previously by N. A. Greenberg, “The Use of *Poieia* and *Poiesis*,” *HSCP* 65 (1961) 263–89, esp. 276–83; and by G. B. Walsh, “Philodemus on the Terminology of Neoptolemus,” *Mnemosyne* 40 (1987): 56–68.

Philodemus' second thoughts is a distinction between the "work" or product (ἔργον) and the craftsman who "works out" (ἐργαζόμενος) the product. As Philodemus shows subsequently, he himself subordinates *poiesis* logically to "poem" by defining *poiesis* as a poem with a continuously woven theme. Neoptolemus, by contrast, coordinated *poiesis* with "poem."

In addition to emending Neoptolemus' use of "poet," "poem," and *poiesis*, Philodemus questions his use of the term "poetic craft," ποιητική. He hypothesizes that Neoptolemus might have understood ποιητική as ἐργασία, the "working" of poems and *poieseis*, instead of as τέχνη, "craft." He objects, first, that this is contrary to ordinary usage and, second, that it is ridiculous to call the poet an εἶδος of ποιητική understood in this way. Philodemus' hypothesis seems far-fetched; but it is not unfounded. It is prompted by Neoptolemus' classification of poems and *poieseis* as divisions of ποιητική. If ποιητική is ἐργασία, then poems and *poieseis* may indeed be admitted as divisions of it. There is no way, however, of accommodating the poet within this genus, quite apart from the violence done to the sense.

What, then, can we tell about Neoptolemus' own use of terms? What did he call "poems" and *poieseis*? Did he use the term "dispositions" or "weavings"? If so, how did he apply these terms? What is his alternative, if any, to Philodemus' proposal to call poems "works"? How could Neoptolemus possibly have objected to the definition of "poet" as "one who has the ability and works from it"? We need to look at the rest of Philodemus' account before we can venture some answers.

In the next section of text, Philodemus tells us something about Neoptolemus' distinction between "poem" and *poiesis*:

Cols. 11.26–12.13:

... θαυμα[στέον] δ' αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ [τὸ] τη[ς] ποιήσεως
εἶναι τ[ῆ]ν ὑπόθεσιν [μό-
νον, καὶ τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ
30 πάντων ὅλως τῆς ποιήσε-
ως ὄντων. ἡ μὲν [γὰρ] πό-
ησις καὶ π[ό]ημά γ' ἐστίν,
οἶον ἡ Ἰλ[ιάς], οἱ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ
στίχοι τρι[άκ]οντα ταύ[τ]ης
35 πόημα μ[έ]ν, οὐ μέντοι ποί-
ησις. καὶ τὸ ποιή[ματος] μό-
νον τῇν [σύνθεσιν] τῆς
λέξεως μ[ετέχ]ειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ
τὰς διανοίας καὶ ἥθη
5 καὶ πράξεις καὶ π[ροσω-
ποποιί]ας. εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ
λέξει πεποιῆσθαι ταῦτα
λέγει, κἀνταῦθα νῆ Δι' οὐ-
κ ἔστι τι πεποιῆσθαι τοῦ
10 τῶν χωρὶς, ἀλλ' ἴδιον τοῦ
συνκεῖσθαι τῇν λέξιν τὸ

It is astonishing of him to
claim that only theme
belongs to *poiesis*, even
though "poem" and all
things in general belong to
poiesis. For *poiesis*, such as
the *Iliad*, is also a "poem,"
whereas the first thirty
lines of it are a "poem," not
poiesis. Also, [it is astonishing]
that only verbal composition
[participates] in a "poem,"
[but not] thoughts, [character],
actions, and personifications.
But if [he says that these things]
have been elaborated poetically
in diction, [by Zeus] it is not
possible for anything to be
elaborated here without
them. Instead, it seems to
me that the composition of

συνκεῖσθαι [τὴν πράξιν] ἐῖ-
 ναι φαίνεται μοι . . .

[an action] is [a distinctive
 feature] of the composition of
 diction.²⁰

This passage deals first with *poiesis*, then with “poem.” Neoptolemus proposed that only “theme,” ὑπόθεσις, belongs to *poiesis*, and only “verbal composition,” σύνθεσις τῆς λέξεως, belongs to “poem.” Against the first claim, Philodemus contends that *poiesis* is a logical subdivision of the genus “poem” and so has everything that a poem has and more, in fact, everything.²¹ He explains that whereas a poem can be a fragment of *poiesis*, for example the first thirty lines of the *Iliad*, *poiesis* is necessarily a whole poem, as exemplified by the *Iliad*.²² Since “poem” is a genus that embraces both *poiesis* and non-*poiesis*, Philodemus argues, *poiesis* has all the generic features of a poem, as well as its own distinguishing feature, theme. Second, against Neoptolemus’ claim that only verbal composition belongs to “poem,” Philodemus protests that if verbal composition consists in the elaboration of thoughts, actions, personifications, and so on, these components of a poem’s theme are inseparable from the verbal form; hence theme is inseparable from “poem.”

Neoptolemus, then, classifies *poiesis* and “poem” as coordinate divisions of the poetic craft by defining *poiesis* as “theme” and “poem” as “verbal composition.” Philodemus objected to this separation of content and verbal form in his introductory attack on Neoptolemus. His argument now suggests that Neoptolemus defined “poem” (ποίημα) etymologically as something that has been “made” in words; and he objects that if there is an underlying subject matter that has been “made,” or elaborated, in a linguistic medium, this subject matter is essential to the verbal form. Elsewhere in *On Poems*, Philodemus distinguishes between a theme that has not been “made” poetically (ἀπόητον ὑπόθεσιν) and one that has been,²³ and between thoughts that are “not made” poetically (ἀπόητα)

20. I use three closely spaced dots to indicate text that I have omitted. Widely spaced dots stand for illegible letters. At col. 12.8, Mangoni’s reading [λέ]γει is much preferable to Jensen’s [πρέ]πει. Jensen’s reading of col. 12.3–4 is doubtful. I supply [καὶ ἦθη] at line 4 in place of Jensen’s [καὶ τᾶς]εις. ἦθη complements the list better than τᾶς]εις; it also fits the space much better. Another possibility is πάθη, “sufferings” or “feelings.” Mangoni reads NAC at the beginning of line 4; if this is the original text, it entails changes in Jensen’s supplements. I supply πεποιῆσθαι [ταῦτα] in col. 12.7; Jensen supplies πεποιῆσθαι τ[ι], but several more letters are required to fill out the line.

21. Jensen, *Philodemos*, pp. 104–5; A. Ardizzoni, *ΠΟΙΗΜΑ. Ricerche sulla teoria del linguaggio poetico nell’ antichità* (Bari, 1953), pp. 18–20; Brink, *Prolegomena*, p. 61, n. 2; and Walsh, “Philodemus,” p. 59, n. 7, all agree that Philodemus differs from Neoptolemus in subordinating *poiesis* logically to poem. Against Jensen, Rostagni, “Filodemo,” p. 440, n. 1, argued that Neoptolemus agreed with Philodemus on this point. Rostagni took the genitive absolute at col. 11.29–31 to express Neoptolemus’ own view, citing as evidence cols. 12.35–13.1, which he took to mean that Neoptolemus predicated “poem” of *poiesis*. This interpretation of cols. 12.35–13.1 is forced (see below, n. 46); and the whole interpretation makes havoc of Neoptolemus’ distinction between *poiesis* and poem as divisions of the poetic craft. Rostagni was followed by P. Boyancé, “A propos de l’Art poétique d’Horace,” *RPh* 10 (1936): 20–36, esp. 22; by Greenberg, “*Poema* and *Poiesis*,” p. 280; and by Dahlmann, “Varros Schrift,” p. 122.

22. Philodemus refers to the contrast between “poem” and *poiesis* again later in *On Poems* 5 (col. 35.7–14). He exemplifies the technical sense of “poem” by epigram and the poems of Sappho, but allows that these poems may also be called *poiesis* so that *poiesis* becomes coextensive with “poem.” As in his criticism of Neoptolemus, Philodemus understands “poem” as predicable of *poiesis*.

23. PHerc. 1081, tr. 3, fr. e, col. 1.26–col. 2.9; and PHerc. 1074, tr. 3, fr. f, col. 1.12–19 Sbordone.

and those that have been “made” into poems (πεποημένα).²⁴ In Philodemus’ view, if a poem has a theme, it is both a thematic and a verbal construct. Neoptolemus takes the position that a theme is essentially different from the linguistic elaboration.

Neoptolemus is the first known author to distinguish systematically among the four terms, “poetic craft,” “poet,” “poem,” and *poiesis*. As later sources show, it became customary for grammarians and others to introduce discussions of poetry with definitions of all or some of these terms.²⁵ The distinction between poem and *poiesis* is particularly well attested and can be traced, after Neoptolemus, as early as Lucilius in the latter part of the second century B.C. Despite numerous divergences, there is a consensus that a poem is a linguistic construct and that *poiesis* requires a theme. At the same time, the sources throw light on the dispute between Philodemus and Neoptolemus.

In agreement with Philodemus, Posidonius subordinated *poiesis* logically to “poem,” whereas Varro defined the two terms in a way that lends itself to a Neoptolemean interpretation. Posidonius defined “poem” as “metrical or rhythmical diction (λέξις), with elaboration, going beyond prose form,” as exemplified by the metrical phrase γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ (“Greatest Earth and Aither of Jupiter”); and he defined *poiesis* as “a poem with meaning, containing an imitation of divine and human things.”²⁶ According to Varro, a “poem is rhythmical diction (*lexis*), that is, a number of words put together metrically into a certain form,” as exemplified “even” by a two-verse epigram; and *poiesis* is “a continuous theme out of rhythms” (*perpetuum argumentum ex rhythmis*), like the *Iliad* or Ennius’ *Annals*.²⁷ In both Posidonius’ and Varro’s definitions, “poem” is “verse,” and *poiesis* implies a certain content. But whereas Posidonius defines “poem” as a genus which embraces *poiesis* as a subdivision, Varro opposes “poem” to *poiesis* as diction to theme, without subordinating the latter logically to the former. Although such a subordination may be superimposed on Varro’s definitions, Varro does not draw such a distinction and there is good reason to resist it. A theme made out of verse is not the same as verse with a theme. At issue is the relationship of form to content: the content may be viewed as a noetic construct in its own right, distinct from the language that expresses it, as Neoptolemus views it; or it may be

24. PHerc. 1081, tr. 3, fr. n.1–9, cf. fr. h.22–23 Sb.

25. For example, Varro (n. 27 below) and Diomedes (n. 30 below) define poetice, poema, and poesis; various scholiasts on Dion. Thrax define all four terms (179.26–180.7, 449.21–26, and 481.6–16 Hildgard), as does Athonius (n. 30 below). F. Marx has collected most of the testimonies about “poem” and *poiesis* in his edition of Lucilius (pp. 129–31). These testimonies have been much discussed; for a brief overview, see Brink, *Prolegomena*, p. 61, n. 1.

26. Diog. Laert. 7.60 (= fr. 44 Edelstein): ποίημα δὲ ἐστὶν . . . λέξις ἔμμετρος ἢ ἐνρυθμος μετὰ (κατα)σκευῆς τὸ λογοειδὲς ἐκβεβηκυῖα. [τὸν] ἐνρυθμον δὲ εἶναι τὸ γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθήρ. ποίησις δὲ ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν ποίημα, μίμησιν περιέχον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

27. *Parmeno* fr. 398 Bücheler: “poema est lexis enrythmos, id est, verba plura modice in quamdam coniecta formam. itaque etiam distichon epigrammation vocant poema. poesis est perpetuum argumentum ex rhythmis, ut Ilias Homeri et Annales Enni. poetice est ars earum rerum.” Varro’s summary definition of “poetice” as the “art of these things” agrees with Philodemus’ reminder that the term ποιητική is the name of the craft; cf. Diomedes and Athonius (n. 30 below).

viewed as inseparable from the language, as Posidonius and Philodemus regard it. Neoptolemus drew a sharp distinction between form and content, by balancing language and theme logically against each other as distinct “species.” Philodemus protests this separation vehemently, not only in his criticism of Neoptolemus but throughout *On Poems*.

Whereas the many extant definitions of poem and *poiesis* preserve traces of this fundamental opposition, they offer no reason to suppose that the two sides differed on the size of a poem. On both sides of the issue, a poem may be exemplified by a small or incomplete composition. Since a “poem” can be as short as the smallest metrical unit, whereas *poesis* must have a full thematic development, it is easy to slide from merely illustrating “poem” by a metrical phrase or short poem to identifying “poem” simply as a short metrical unit or as a part of *poiesis*. Thus Lucilius identifies “poem” as a “small part,” as exemplified by an epistle, and *poiesis* as a “much larger,” complete, single work and a “single *θέσις*,” like the *Iliad* or Ennius’ *Annals*.²⁸ Lucilius preserves Neoptolemus’ definition of *poiesis* as “theme”; but he also seems to conflate this definition with the view of *poiesis* as a large-scale verbal construct. Similarly, a scholiast on Dionysius Thrax’s *Art of Grammar* states that “*poiesis* in the strict sense is a complete theme in meter (διὰ μέτρων ἐντελὴς ὑπόθεσις), having beginnings, middles, and ends, whereas a poem is a part of *poiesis*.”²⁹ This commentator drew on the same definition of *poiesis* as Varro; on the other hand, his definition of “poem” seems to fit a Posidonian position. It is hardly to be expected that the short handbook accounts of poem and *poesis* should preserve the rather subtle distinction between the two views of *poiesis*; and what we see in Lucilius and the scholiast may simply be an uncritical merging of positions. But it may also be noted that the definition of “poem” as part of *poiesis* does not entail that *poiesis* is a linguistic construct; for, by another subtlety, a poem may form “part” of *poiesis* as a material prerequisite of the theme, not as a material part of a linguistic whole.

Some of the later sources exemplify “poem,” defined as a part of *poiesis*, by a single “rhapsody” (that is, book of epic) or by a tragedy.³⁰ Other sources offer the basic definition of “poem” as verse. Elaborating on Posidonius’ definition of “poem,” some scholia on Dionysius Thrax define “poem” as “metrical and rhythmical diction, more archaic and more elevated

28. *Satire* 9.339–47 Marx = Nonius Marcellus 691–92 Lindsay: “primum hoc quod dicimus esse poema, / pars est parva; . . . epistula item quaevis non magna poema est. / illa poesis opus totum, ut tota Ilias una est, / una *θέσις* sunt Annales Enni atque *ἔπος* unum, / et maius multo est quam quod dixi ante poema.”

29. 449.24–26 Hilgard: ποίησις δὲ κυρίως ἢ διὰ μέτρων ἐντελὴς ὑπόθεσις ἔχουσα ἀρχὰς καὶ μέσα καὶ πέρατα. ποίημα δὲ μέρος ποιήσεως.

30. Diomedes (*Ars Gram.*, *GL*, 1:473.17–20), for example, makes these distinctions: “distat autem poetica a poemate et poesi, quod poetica ars ipsa intellegitur, poema autem pars operis, ut tragoedia, poesis contextus et corpus totius operis effecti, ut Ilias Odyssia Aeneis.” Diomedes (*GL*, 1:484.12) also notes that a rhapsody is called ποιήσεως μέρος in Greek. Aphonius (= Marius Victorinus, *GL*, 6:56.19–21), after explaining “poet” and defining “poetice” as *ars ipsa*, explains: “nam poesis et poema distant eo quod poema (uno) tantum modo clauditur carmine, ut tragoedia vel rhapsodia, poesis autem ex pluribus, id est corpus operis confecti, ut Ilias Homeri et Aeneis Vergilii.” See further Hermogenes (*Prog.*, *RG*, 2:4.21–27 Spengel) and Eustathius (*ad Il.* 6.19–22 Rom.).

than a prose arrangement.”³¹ One grammarian defines “poem” as “material enclosed in definite, regular feet.”³² Underlying all these variants is the contrast between *poiesis* as a thematically complete unit and “poem” as a metrically complete unit. These two entities may be coextensive, even though a “poem” may also be much shorter than a poem with a theme.

The later tradition is clearly indebted to Aristotle’s notion of organic unity and, beyond Aristotle, to Plato’s contrast between thematically unified and disjointed discourse. Behind the scholiast’s requirement for “beginnings, middles, and ends” is Plato’s demand in the *Phaedrus* that every discourse be composed like the “body” of an animal, with “middles and extremities that fit one another and the whole.”³³ Plato cites a four-line epigram as an example of a discourse that does not have this unity, and exemplifies unity in poetry by tragedy. He also criticizes the rhetoricians for teaching the parts of a speech—for example, proem, proof, indirect praise, slander, and so on—rather than how to put the parts into a fitting whole. This is a “warp with gaps in it.”³⁴ Later authors take over Plato’s metaphors of body and weaving. Some late Latin sources define *poiesis* as *textus* or *contextus*, whose root meaning is “weaving”; some also define *poiesis* as the “body” of a complete work.³⁵ On the Greek side, Eustathius describes the “stitching together” of rhapsodies into *poiesis* as a single “weaving” (ὕφος).³⁶ Likewise, a scholiast on Dionysius Thrax refers to the stitching of rhapsodies as the “weaving” of a theme.³⁷ While “weaving” was a commonly used metaphor for poetic composition, its application to epic has a special point: an epic is not a patchwork of songs roughly “stitched” together, as the etymological sense of “rhapsody” might suggest, but a “weaving” made out of songs that are so finely stitched that no seams are visible.³⁸ Philodemus uses the metaphor in the same way when he proposes that Neoptolemus should have compared *poieseis* to “weavings” (ὕφη).

Although our sources are consistent in illustrating *poiesis* only by epic, this does not imply that either Neoptolemus or the later sources restricted

31. 180.4–7 and 481.8–12 Hilgard: φράσις ἑμμετρος καὶ ἔρρυθμος, ἀρχαιότερα καὶ σεμνότερα τῆς λογικῆς συντάξεως, κατὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων ἢ ὡς ὑποκειμένων τιθεμένη. (At 180.4, ἔρρυθμος should be read in place of εὐρυθμος.) The commentators (315.7–8 and 481.1–8 Hilgard) attempt to defend Dionysius’ definition of a rhapsody as “part of a poem” (instead of “part of *poiesis*”) by the desperate explanation that each of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is a poem “relatively to the most generic *poiesis*” (πρὸς τὴν γενικωτάτην ποιήσιν), the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* together. It is not clear whether Dionysius himself used “poem” in the technical sense of a metrical construct or simply in the everyday sense.

32. *De differentiis* (GL, 7:525.11–13): “poesis [sc. est] operum contextus, poema certis pedibus et legitimis inclusa materia.”

33. *Phdr.* 264C: . . . δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σώμα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μῆτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μῆτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. The scholia on Dion. Thrax also explain, with a clear debt to Aristotle, that “*poiesis* does not have its beginning in what has preceded, but brings the thought to completion continuously” (ποίησις . . . ἀρχὴν μὲν οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τοῖς προτέροις, τὸ δὲ νόημα ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις ἀποτελεῖ, pp. 180.2–3, 481.15–16 Hilgard).

34. *Phdr.* 268A: διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡτρίον.

35. See Diomedes and Athonius (n. 30 above), also *De differentiis* (n. 32 above); Nonius Marcellus (691.5–7 Lindsay) defines: “poesis est textus scriptorum, poema inventio parva quae paucis verbis expeditur.”

36. Eust. *ad Il.* 6.31 Rom.

37. 179.9–10 Hilgard; the scholiast uses the verb ἐξυφαίνεται.

38. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses συναφαίνειν in reference to the interweaving of linguistic elements throughout *De compositione* (see Roberts’ index); cf. his use of ὕφη in chap. 23 (234.12 Roberts).

poiesis to epic. As commonly used, a “theme” (ὑπόθεσις) can be large or small. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* each has a single, complete theme, but each book, or “rhapsody,” also has a theme.³⁹ The plots of tragedies and comedies were commonly summarized under the heading ὑπόθεσις (*argumentum*). Menander’s classification of epideictic rhetoric is a classification of themes, from the most general (praise or blame) to the most specific (such as a particular kind of propemptikon).⁴⁰ Each theme has a unity of its own. But since every theme except a full-scale epic theme may be part of a larger theme, the distinctive unity of *poiesis* is exemplified perfectly only by epic.⁴¹ Just as there was a slide toward identifying a “poem” as a small composition, so there was a proclivity to view *poiesis* as epic. Both views are incidental to the basic distinction between a metrical and a thematic unit.

The term “theme,” ὑπόθεσις, implies a development of ideas, as opposed to the expression of a single thought or disconnected thoughts. Neoptolemus, therefore, does not simply draw a contrast between verbal form and content. A Stoic, whom Philodemus discusses just after Neoptolemus, made such a contrast by dividing a poem into “verbal composition” and “thought” (διάνοια).⁴² This general contrast was commonplace, and Philodemus imputes it to Neoptolemus when he accuses him of separating the verbal composition from the thoughts. In his tripartite division, however, Neoptolemus gives special recognition to his predecessors’ demand for unity by making “theme” a subdivision of the art of poetry. *Poiesis* is analogous to “poem” in that it is a unified structure; it uses thoughts, actions, and so on, as its components just as a poem uses syllables or letters as its building blocks.

Let us now return to Philodemus’ text. Neoptolemus demarcated his εἶδη further in these two ways, which Philodemus finds silly:

Cols. 12.17–13.4:

... εὖ-	... It is silly to
ἡθ[ως] δὲ γέγραπται καὶ	write that themes and
τὸ [μ]ῆ κοιωνε[ῖν] τῷ	poems do not have
20 πο[ιητῇ]ι τ[ῶ]ν ἀμα[ρτ]ιῶν	mistakes in common
τὰς ὑ[ποθέ]σεις καὶ τὰ πο-	with the poet. For poor

39. See Dion. Thrax (8.4 Uhlig); the scholia on Dion. Thrax (180.12, 315.5–20, and 481.3–6 Hilgard); and Eust. (*ad Il.* 6.20–21 Rom.). The distinction between an overall theme and subordinate themes was also applied to historical writings. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Pomp.* 3, p. 112 Roberts; cf. 5, p. 118), Thucydides fashioned a “single body” by taking a single “theme” with many parts, whereas Herodotus created a “single, harmonious (σύμφωνον) body” out of many dissimilar “themes.” In agreement with the technical usage of ποιήσις, Dionysius says that he is not embarrassed to call both works ποιήσεις (*Pomp.* 3, p. 116 Roberts). Likewise, Hermogenes (*Prog.*, *RG* 2:4.21–27 Spengel) and Aphthonius (*Prog.*, *RG* 2:22.3–4 Spengel) compare *poiesis* to “narrative” (διήγησις), and “poem” to “narration” (διήγημα). Hermogenes cites the complete works of Herodotus and Thucydides as examples of narrative, and the episodes of Arion and Alcmæon as examples of narration.

40. The term ὑπόθεσις occurs frequently in Menander’s *On epideictic*; see pp. 380.26, 381.6–7, etc. Russell/Wilson = *RG* 9:235–38. Elegies and letters, too, could have themes; see *Ov. Tr.* 5.1.10 and *Cic. Att.* 9.4.1.

41. It is especially surprising that whereas Aristotle proposed tragedy as the paradigm of a unified poem (cf. *Pl. Phdr.* 268D), later sources see it as lacking completeness. They seem to be influenced by Aristotle’s view that an epic may contain a number of tragedies (*Poet.* 1462b4–5, cf. 1456a12, 1459b3–7).

42. *On Poems* 5, col. 14.12–14, etc.

	ἡμ[ατα]. πονηρά γάρ [ἔσ]τιν	poems and bad themes
	ὅτ[ε γί]νετα[ι] ποιήματα	of <i>poieseis</i> sometimes
	κα[ὶ ὑπ]οθέσε[ις] φαῦλαι ποι-	come about when
25	[ή]σ[εω]ν ἀ[φ]αμαρ[τά]νον-	the poet makes
	το[ς τοῦ] ποιητοῦ. τὸ [τοι-	a mistake. In saying
	νυ[ν π]ρωτεύ[ει]ν τ[ῶν	that poems are first of
	εἰδῶ[ν] τὰ ποιήματα λ[έ-	the species . . .
	γων [. . .]N καὶ ΤΟΥ . . [. . .]	he was not sharp.
30	ΤΑ. [οὐ δ]ριμύς ἦν. εἰ	If [he meant] that a poem is
	μὲ[ν ἔ]λεγε] τὸ τῇ τά[ξει	first in arrangement, he
	πρῶ[το]ν εἶναι, ξένως [ἐ-	uttered something wholly
	λάλει [π]αντάπασιν. εἰ δ[ὲ	strange. If [he meant] that
	τὸ βέλ[τι]ον, πῶς μάλλον	it is better, how is it more
35	τῆς ποιήσεως, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο	so than <i>poiesis</i> , which
Col. 13.1 ΗΦΕΝ; εἰ δὲ πρὸς τ[ᾶ	also . . . this. If he compared
	διανο]ήματα τὸ πεποι-	the poetic elaboration with
	ῆσθαι] συνέκρινε, πάν-	the thoughts, he [surely]
	[τως καὶ ὕσ]τερον ἔλεγεν.	said that it is [later]. ⁴³

First, Neoptolemus claims that faults belonging to the categories of “poem” and *poiesis* are distinct from faults belonging to the “poet.” Philodemus objects that there is an overlap: faulty poems and themes sometimes come about through fault of the poet. This seems plain common sense. But Neoptolemus, I suggest, has something more subtle in mind: each category has its own flaws, as well as merits, so that a poet’s faults belong entirely to him, without spilling over into the poem or *poiesis*. For example, sounds may have some harshness that cannot be removed by the poet, and themes may require some discontinuity in their presentation. On the other hand, it is the poet’s job to be familiar with the rules of versification and his topic. Neoptolemus does not deny that bad poets write bad verse and bad stories. His point is that when the badness is due to the poet, it is not due to exigencies of verse or theme, and conversely.

As for the claim that “poem” is first among the species, Philodemus tries out three possibilities. One is that it is first “in arrangement” (τά[ξει]). Philodemus says that this would be exceedingly strange. Earlier in his book, Philodemus criticized Demetrius of Byzantium for arranging his three requirements in the following order: first, thought; second, stories; and third, verbal composition.⁴⁴ Demetrius’ order is that of successive stages in the making of a poem: verbal composition comes last, after the poet has thought about the poem and provided a content. A related ex-

43. I omit col. 12.13–17, which has been heavily restored by Jensen and could admit of a wholly different reading. At col. 12.24–25 I adopt Mangoni’s reading ποι[ή]σ[εω]ν, as opposed to Jensen’s ποιν[ή]μα[των]. I also follow Mangoni at col. 12.28–34 (“Metodi argomentativi nel V libro περί ποιημάτων di Filodemo di Gadara,” in *Atti del XIX Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia, Cairo 1989*, forthcoming), except that I substitute [ἔλεγε] for [γάρ ἔφη] in line 31. Mangoni’s most important new reading is βέλ[τι]ον in place of Jensen’s βέλ[τι]στον. Mangoni reads col. 12.35–13.4 as follows: τῆς ποιήσεως, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο [πε/ριε]λήφεν; εἰ δὲ πρὸς τ[ᾶ / διανο]ήματα τὸ πεποι/[ῆσθαι] συνέκρινε, πάν[τα / καὶ πρό]τερον ἔλεγεν. Since τοῦτο appears to end line 35, [πε/ριε]λήφεν seems too long for the available space. Jensen supplied ἢ καὶ τοῦτο / [προσ]ῆψεν; but Φ appears clearly on the papyrus at col. 13.1. On my reading [ὑσ]τερον at col. 13.4, see below, n. 47.

44. Col. 10.20–32.

ample of “arrangement” is the Peripatetic ordering of the parts of rhetoric as invention, followed in turn by arrangement, diction, memory, and delivery.⁴⁵ If “first,” then, is understood as “first” in the making of a poem, it would indeed be strange to put the linguistic structure before the theme, let alone before the ability of the poet. Philodemus’ second suggestion is that “first” means “better”; and he objects that a poem cannot be better than *poiesis*.⁴⁶ Third, Philodemus ventures the hypothesis that Neoptolemus compared the verbal elaboration with the thoughts. Unfortunately, there is a crucial gap in the text, but an obvious objection would be that verbal elaboration is causally dependent on the thoughts, so that it is surely posterior, not prior to them.⁴⁷

What, then, makes a poem “first” in Neoptolemus’ classification? Dionysius of Halicarnassus recommended that young people should train themselves in diction before giving attention to subject matter; for the latter task requires a mature insight—grey hairs, even—based on much investigation and experience.⁴⁸ Since a poem is first as a species of the craft, it is plausible that Neoptolemus likewise placed verbal composition first in the training of a poet.⁴⁹ The first step in the acquisition of the craft is skill in verbal composition. There follows mastery of theme; and last of all, the ability of the poet is perfected on the basis of these two skills.⁵⁰

Philodemus’ final remarks on Neoptolemus concern the good poet and Homer in particular:

Cols. 13.5–28:

5	... ἡ]γεμονίαν ἡ συν- τέλεια]ν καὶ τοῖς μ[εγά- λοις ποι]ήμασιν περιθῆ- σιν] καὶ ΠΡΟCΑΡΤ confer leadership and [completeness] on [large poems] as well, and
	. . . τ]ῷ τελείῳ ποι[η- 10 τῇ μετὰ τ]ῆς ψυχαγωγ[γι- α]ς τὴν τῶν] ἀκουόντων]ν ὠ[φέλησι]ν καὶ χρησι[μο- λ[ογία]ν καὶ τὸν Ὁμη[ρον]	[that] . . . the perfect poet benefits listeners and says what is useful, along with moving them, and

45. Quintilian (3.3.1–10) mentions that there was controversy about the order of these requirements, especially about the place of memory; see below, n. 54. There was also debate on how the parts of philosophy should be ordered. Sextus Empiricus cites τάξις, understood as the order in which the parts should be studied, along with historical priority (χρόνος) and necessity, as three criteria for assigning first, second, and third place to the three parts of philosophy (*Math.* 7. 20, cf. 22); cf. Diog. Laert. 7.40–41 and Plut. *De Stoic. repug.* 1035A–E.

46. Philodemus’ objection is cut short in our text by a lacuna in col. 13.1. I take τοῦτο (col. 12.35) to refer to the predicate βέλτιον, which is the immediate antecedent. Jensen, followed by Rostagni, “Filodemo,” p. 440, n. 1, and others, take it to refer to “poem”; but this is grammatically very strained.

47. At col. 13.3–4, Rostagni, “Filodemo,” pp. 441–43, reads πάντως / καὶ πρότερον ἔλεγον in place of Jensen’s ταῦτο / καὶ πρότερον ἔλεγεν. I adopt πάν/τως] and propose [ὑς]τερον in place of [πρό]τερον. This reading has the advantage that Philodemus is stating another, strong objection.

48. *Comp.* 1, pp. 66–68 Roberts; cf. Aristotle *Poet.* 1450a35–38.

49. Boyancé suggests likewise that “poem” is temporally prior to the conception of great themes. Jensen, “Philodemos,” p. 107 (cf. “Herakleides,” p. 293), takes Neoptolemus to mean that stylistic elaboration is the most important or most extensive of the three divisions. This interpretation rests on a doubtful reading and interpretation of col. 13.1–4 (see n. 46 above), as well as on a presumed parallel with Horace’s *Ars Poetica*.

50. Brink, *Prolegomena*, p. 73, suggests a similar progression.

	τέρ[πε]ιν . . .	that Homer delights . . .
	. . .	
20	διὰ τί γέγραφεν [ὅτι] μέ- γιστος ἦν ποιήτης; [κ]αὶ π[οῖ]ο[ν γέ]νος προσεῖναι δεῖ τ[ῆ]ς ὠφελήσεως καὶ χρησ[ι]μολογίας οὐ [δ]ιε- 25 σάφης[ε]ν, ὥστε ἐξεῖναι καὶ τῇ[ν] ἐκ σοφί]ας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [ἐ]π[ι]στημῶ[ν ὑ]- πακού[ε]ιν.	. . . [why] he wrote that he was the greatest poet? Also, he did not make clear what kind of benefit and useful speech must be present, so that it is possible to understand the benefit that comes from wisdom and the other sciences. ⁵¹

Although this passage is poorly preserved, it presents clearly a fundamental requirement of Neoptolemus' poetics: the perfect poet must both benefit and move the listener. Benefit (ὠφελήσις) is associated with "saying what is useful" (χρησιμολογία); moving the listener (ψυχαγωγία) is associated with delight (τέρπειν). The issue goes back to Plato's famous proclamation in the *Republic* (607D) that poetry should not only be pleasant, but also be beneficial for cities and human life. In the continuing Hellenistic debate, Neoptolemus ranges himself on the side of Plato. Concerning utility, Philodemus brings an objection that he makes elsewhere: Neoptolemus did not make clear the kind of benefit, so that one could understand it as dependent on "wisdom and the other sciences." As Philodemus remarks elsewhere, to require complete wisdom of the poet is to make poetic goodness impossible.⁵² The "other sciences" may be exemplified by geography, generalship, navigation, and so on. Because they are distinct from the science of poetry, Philodemus implies, there is no need for the poet to have them. For the rest, Neoptolemus appears to have cited Homer as the most nearly perfect poet. Although the text is broken, it is plausible that Neoptolemus assigned "leadership" along with "completeness" to the Homeric epics.

What we can reasonably extract from Philodemus' account, then, is that Neoptolemus divided the craft of poetry into three species—poet, poem, and *poiesis*—each with its own flaws and merits, of which poem comes first in the acquisition of the craft and concerns verbal composition, *poiesis* concerns theme, and the poet has the goal of both benefitting and moving the listener. Accordingly, one type of poetic skill is the composition of verse with or without theme, and another is the construction of

51. I have omitted the middle section because of its uncertainty. At lines 8–14, I have adopted Mangoni's reading. Jensen reads 13.4–13 as follows: ὁ / [δ'] εἰπῶν ἁρμονίαν ἢ συν[τέλεια]ν καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις ποιήμασιν περιθ[έ]σιν καὶ πρὸς ἀρε[τή]ν / δεῖν τ[ῶ]ι τελείῳ ποι[η]τῇ μετὰ τ[ῆ]ς ψυχαγωγ[ί]ας τοῦ τοῦς ἀκούον[τας] / ὠφελ[εῖ]ν καὶ χρησ[ι]μο[λ]ογ[εῖ]ν. Mangoni's most important new reading in this section is [ῆ]γεμονίαν at line 5. It is based on an inspection of the papyrus, which shows the upper part of H, followed by Γ and a faint Ε. Jensen's μεγάλοις at lines 6–7 is a good guess, based on Α in both transcripts; this could stand for the first part of M. At lines 20–21, Jensen's μέγ[ιστος] is plausible. The manuscript of the Naples transcript has MH at the end of line 20 (corresponding to ME in the Oxford transcript) and a vertical stroke at the beginning of line 21; this is omitted from the printed version. The new reading [ῆ]γεμονίαν supports Jensen's conjecture συν[τέλεια]ν against Brink's συν[έχεια]ν (*Prolegomena*, p. 56).

52. See, for example, *On Poems* 5, col. 35.23–26.

themes. But it is still unclear how the third type—the poet—fits in. The key to the problem is held, I suggest, by a text that has been adduced in the past in favor of a twofold distinction between craftsman and craft. In *Partitiones Oratoriae*, Cicero divides the rhetorical craft into three parts (*partes*): the ability of the speaker (*vis oratoris*); the speech (*oratio*); and the issue (*quaestio*).⁵³ This division is no more a dichotomy between craftsman and craft than is Neoptolemus'. Cicero's three "parts" correspond to Neoptolemus' "species" of poet, poem, and *poiesis*; and Cicero's detailed analysis helps to explain the motivation for this classification.

Cicero subdivides each of the three parts of rhetoric as follows. First, he divides the "ability of the speaker" into five abilities, arranged into two pairs (one dealing with subject matter, the other with diction), together with a fifth: to invent subject matter, to arrange it, to supply diction, to deliver the words, and to memorize.⁵⁴ These abilities correspond to the five Peripatetic divisions of rhetoric. Second, "speech" (*oratio*, a translation of λόγος) is divided into four parts: exordium, narration, proof, and peroration, of which the exordium and peroration aim to teach (*docere*), and narration and proof aim to move the soul (*impellere animos, commovere*).⁵⁵ Third, "issue" (*quaestio*, a translation of ζήτησις or ζήτημα) is divided into general issue (θέσις) and particular issue (or "case," ὑπόθεσις). The former consists of abstract philosophical questions, not involving particular persons or circumstances, whereas the latter deals with particular persons and circumstances.⁵⁶ "Case" (ὑπόθεσις) is further divided into three kinds: panegyric, deliberative, and forensic. Like all the preceding divisions, the three kinds of cases are derived by dichotomy: listeners are divided into those who merely listen and those who judge; and the latter are said to judge either the past or the future.⁵⁷ In each of these divisions, numerous additional divisions are made, usually by dichotomy.⁵⁸ Each main category is not only explained in its own place, but also discussed in connection with other categories. This intermingling of categories results in much repetition. The two aims, teaching and moving the listener, serve as structuring principles throughout the analysis.⁵⁹

Cicero attributes the entire classification to the Academy.⁶⁰ The systematic use of dichotomy is an obvious sign of Academic authorship. The question and answer format also agrees with an Academic origin. Further,

53. *Part. Or.* 3–4, 61. Norden, "Die Composition und Litteraturgattung," p. 509, includes *Part. Or.* among his evidence for the twofold distinction. O. Immisch, "Horazens Epistel über die Dichtkunst," *Philologus*, supp. vol. 24 (1932), correctly points out the correspondence between Cicero's and Neoptolemus' three divisions (p. 28), but, in agreement with Norden, reduces this division to a twofold division (pp. 9–10).

54. *Part. Or.* 3. Memory follows upon the others as their guardian (*custos*). This is a variation on the regular Peripatetic ordering (see n. 45 above).

55. *Part. Or.* 4 and 27.

56. *Part. Or.* 4 and 61; cf. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.8, *Orat.* 45–46, *Top.* 79.

57. *Part. Or.* 10 and 69. This dichotomy is made by Aristotle himself (*Rh.* 1358b2–8).

58. P. Sternkopf provides an excellent analysis of the dichotomies in *De M. Tulli Ciceronis "Partitionibus Oratoriis"* (Westfalen, 1914).

59. *Part. Or.* 4–5, 9–11, 27, 69, etc.

60. *Part. Or.* 139: "expositae sunt tibi omnes oratoriae partitiones, quae quidem e media illa nostra Academia effluerent." H. Rackham, translator of the Loeb edition (1942), translates "sprung from our

the overall view of rhetoric as having two goals, teaching and moving the listener, is modeled on Plato's proposals for a genuine art of rhetoric. In the *Gorgias* (454E–55A), Plato opposed the “persuasion of teaching” (πειθὸ διδασκαλική) to the pseudo-art of rhetorical persuasion. Following Plato, Cicero assigns to the speaker the goal of teaching, which he identifies with persuasion.⁶¹ In the *Phaedrus*, Plato defines rhetoric as a kind of ψυχαγωγία, or “leading of the soul” (with the connotation of “enchantment”), and demands that the speech must be adapted to the soul of each listener.⁶² Elaborating on this view, Cicero demands that a speaker should “stir the mind,” that is, arouse the emotions of pleasure, distress, fear, and desire, and adapt both teaching and emotional appeal to the particular audience.⁶³ There is much Peripatetic and Stoic material in *Partitiones Oratoriae*, but the basic structure is Academic.

A superficial difference between Cicero's and Neoptolemus' classifications is that Cicero calls the divisions *partes*, “parts,” whereas Neoptolemus calls them εἶδη, “species.” As Plato points out, every species (εἶδος) is a part (μέρος), but not every part is a species; for a species is a part separated at a natural boundary or “joint.”⁶⁴ According to Plato, it is the job of the dialectician to divide things into parts that are species, and to do so as much as possible by dichotomy.⁶⁵ Plato himself gave a virtuoso display of this method in the *Sophist*, in which he divided the crafts into numerous species. He calls these species interchangeably “parts,” “kinds” (γένη), or “species” (εἶδη). Plato's successors in the Academy continued this dialectical enterprise by writing Διαίρεσεις; and Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* is an example of this Academic genre.⁶⁶ As Academic divisions, Cicero's “parts” are species, even though he does not call them so. In agreement with Plato's practice, Cicero mentions in another work that for the sake of clarity it is permissible to use the word “part” instead of “species.”⁶⁷ He has taken this license in *Partitiones Oratoriae*, so that there is no difference in ontological status between Cicero's “parts” and Neoptolemus' “species.”⁶⁸

famous school, the Middle Academy.” The meaning is rather “from the midst of our school, the Academy.” Elsewhere (*Acad.* 1.46 and *Fin.* 5.7), Cicero distinguishes between two Academies only, the Old and the New. He regards Arcesilaos as the founder of the New Academy, whereas others named Arcesilaos as founder of the Middle Academy and Lycades (Arcesilaos' successor) or Carneades as founder of the New Academy (Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 1.220, Diog. Laert. 4.28 and 59).

61. Cicero identifies “teaching” with *fidem facere* (5, 9, 27, etc.), which is a translation of πείθω (πίστιν) ποιεῖν, cf. *Grg.* 453A, 453D, 454D–E, etc., and *Phdr.* 271A.

62. For the definition, see *Phdr.* 261A8 and 271C10.

63. The four emotions (*Part. Or.* 9) are the four main Stoic πάθη. Contrary to the Stoics, who rejected them as absolutely bad, Cicero has a use for them. Cicero shows at *Part. Or.* 90–92 how a speech must be adapted to the particular audience.

64. *Plt.* 263B.

65. *Phdr.* 265E–66B and *Plt.* 287C.

66. Διαίρεσεις are attested for Speusippus and Xenocrates (Diog. Laert. 4.5 and 13). Cicero refers to his work as *oratoriae partitiones* (corresponding to Greek ῥητορικαὶ διαίρεσεις) at 139.

67. *Top.* 14; cf. 30. At *Top.* 30–34, Cicero draws a detailed distinction between “part” (*pars*) and “species” (*forma, species*).

68. The distinction between parts and species was of wide concern in the Hellenistic period. The Stoics, for example, differed among themselves whether the three “parts” of philosophy—logic, physics, and

In the course of his discussion, Cicero abbreviates the title of his first division, “ability of the speaker,” to “speaker” simply.⁶⁹ Neoptolemus makes a similar abbreviation. Philodemus uses the full expression at the very outset of his discussion when he says that Neoptolemus made the poet “who has the poetic craft and ability” a species of the craft. A little later, Philodemus abbreviates this phrase to “who has the ability.” Jensen erroneously understood the “ability” of the poet as a natural ability, or talent, distinct from technical ability; and he has been widely followed.⁷⁰ However, both Philodemus and Neoptolemus are referring to the technical (τεχνική) ability of the poet as poet. It was commonplace to refer to this craftsman’s ability by the phrase “craft and ability.”⁷¹ As rhetorical writers point out, technical “ability” is perfected on the basis of natural talent, practice, and technical learning.⁷² But natural ability as such is not part of the craft; and whenever it is brought into discussion of a craft, it is demarcated from the craft.

Strictly speaking, then, what is subordinate to the craft in Neoptolemus’ classification is an ability, not the person who has the ability. This way of putting the relationship eliminates the absurdity of making the craftsman subordinate to his craft; but it also presents a new problem. A craft was regularly defined as an “ability” of a certain kind. For example, the craft of rhetoric was defined by many as the ability to persuade, and by some (notably the Stoics) as the ability, specifically knowledge, of speaking well.⁷³ It would seem to follow that, instead of being subordinate to the craft, the ability of the craftsman is identical with it. The problem remains if one takes the more precise definition of a craft as a system of cognitions, or “apprehensions”; for these cognitions constitute the ability of the craftsman.⁷⁴ As Cicero illustrates in *Orator ad M. Brutum*, as mentioned earlier, it was commonplace to correlate the craftsman with the craft. In his criticism of Neoptolemus, Philodemus makes the same correlation when he describes the poet as someone who “has the ability and works from it.” Let us return to this problem when we have examined the remaining two divisions.

Cicero’s third division, “issue” (*quaestio*, ζήτημα), corresponds to Neoptolemus’ “theme” (ὑπόθεσις), or *poiesis*. It constitutes the subject matter of “speech,” just as “theme” constitutes the subject matter of a fully developed “poem.” Since rhetorical “issues” are divided into θέσις and ὑπόθεσις, there is also a partial verbal correspondence, although this

ethics—were “species” (εἶδη), “genera” (γέννη), or “topics,” τόπους (Diog. Laert. 7.39). Grammarians commonly explained that, whereas rhetoric is divided into species, the parts of grammar are not species (e.g., the scholiast on Dion. Thrax 453.5–14 Hilgard). Rhetoricians debated whether the three types of speech (forensic, judicial, epideictic) are parts, species, or genera of rhetoric (or, alternatively, of cases; see Quint. 3.3.14–15 and 3.4.9–15, also Doxopater, *Prolegomena*, RG 6:5.1–4). Menander is bored by the longstanding question whether the three types are “species or parts or whatever” (*On epideictic* 331.4–5 Russell/Wilson).

70. Jensen, “Philodemos,” pp. 102–3 is followed by Ardizzoni, *ΠΟΙΗΜΑ*, p. 12, and others.

71. See Cicero *Inv. Rhet.* 1.6–7 (*ars et facultas oratoria*, etc.).

72. As Quintilian puts it, *facultas orandi consummatur natura, arte, exercitatione* (3.5.1); cf. Plato *Phdr.* 269D.

73. See Quint. 2.15.2–37.

74. The Stoic Zeno is responsible for this definition, which came to be used very widely (see *SVF* 1.73).

similarity should not be taken to imply that Neoptolemus restricted poetic themes to events concerning individuals. Neoptolemus might well have used “theme” in a wide sense to include the treatment of abstract philosophical questions. We can only guess why Neoptolemus chose to call his division *ποίησις* instead of “theme.” But the triplet *ποιητής, ποίημα, ποίησις* does make a memorable jingle; and just as “poem” is a term well suited to designate the linguistic object, so *poiesis* is suitable for designating the “making,” or creation, of a theme. Whereas the rhetorical speaker presents an issue, the poet represents life; and this imaginative reconstruction may reasonably be termed *ποίησις*—a poetic creation.⁷⁵

Although Cicero separates “issue” from “speech,” he treats “speech” as language with meaning. As Quintilian points out, “speech” (*oratio*) admits of two senses: verbal composition about a subject matter; or just the words.⁷⁶ In designating his second division as “speech,” Cicero clearly subscribes to the first view. In common with the Stoics and others, he understands “speech” as diction with meaning.⁷⁷ Like Cicero, Neoptolemus separates out the topic from the linguistic composition. Philodemus’ criticism might lead one to suppose that Neoptolemus understood “poem” as words without meaning; but this is, I suggest, to be misled. Philodemus thinks that, by separating the theme from the poem, Neoptolemus separates the meaning from the words. But there is no reason to impute this view to Neoptolemus. The separation of theme leaves intact the linguistic fabric—words together with whatever meaning they may have. A “poem” may be analyzed ultimately into metrical units without meaning; but these units are constituents of meaningful discourse. It is likely that, just as Cicero divides “speech” into exordium, proof, and so on, so Neoptolemus divided “poem” into sections of meaningful discourse, which are intermediate between a fully developed poem and ultimate metrical units. Aristotle’s division of tragedy into four main quantitative parts, prologue, episode, exit, and choral song, provides an example.⁷⁸

Cicero’s division of “speech” corresponds in outline with the Peripatetic category of “arrangement,” *τάξις*. In place of *τάξις*, Plato used the term *διάθεσις*, “disposition,” to draw a contrast with *εὑρεσις*, “invention.”⁷⁹ Later, *διάθεσις* came to be used to designate not only the arrangement of a speech out of its main parts, but also the arrangement of individual words, or verbal composition in general.⁸⁰ Although there is

75. Philodemus does not tell us how Neoptolemus subdivided *poiesis*. We might speculate that he adopted the commonplace distinction between narrative, drama, and a mixed kind, which goes back to Plato. A commentator on Dion. Thrax’s *Art of Grammar* lists narrative, dramatic, and mixed as the three main “types of *poiesis*” (*ποιήσεως χαρακτήρες*, 450.3–7 Hilgard), each having numerous subdivisions. Diomedes (*Ars grammatica*, GL 1:482.14–483.6) lists the same three main types as “kinds of poem” (*poematos genera*).

76. Quint. 2.21.1; cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.48.

77. For the Stoic view, see Diog. Laert. 7.56–57.

78. *Poet.* 12. The scholiast on Dion. Thrax (451.33–452.12 Hilgard) provides a more detailed list that includes “rhetoric” and exchange of dialogue.

79. *Phdr.* 236A.

80. Philodemus mentions the disposition of a speech (*τῆς διαθέσεως τοῦ λόγου*) in *On Rhetoric* 1, PHerc. 1427, col. 1.24–25, p. 9 Auricchio, and at Sudhaus 1:122.34. Hermagoras defined the task of the

no direct evidence, the term is particularly well suited to apply to both Cicero's "speech" and Neoptolemus' "poem," since both are linguistic composites made out of a range of parts, from the smallest prose or metrical cola to large-scale sections, such as a prologue or narration.

Neoptolemus assigns essentially the same two goals to the poet as Cicero assigns to the speaker. Just as Cicero's speaker has the ability to compose a speech on an issue in such a way as to teach and move the audience, so Neoptolemus' poet has the ability to compose a poem on a theme in such a way as to benefit and move the listener. Poetic ability, poem, and poetic theme are all essential elements of the craft, whose overall aim is to benefit and move.

Seen in this way, the craft as a whole is an ability, just as the commonplace definition holds. But this ability admits of further analysis. In his criticism of Neoptolemus, Philodemus draws a distinction between the ability (δύναμις) of the craftsman and his working (ἐργασία) of poems and *poieseis*; and he objects that the working is separate from the craft. If we define the poetic craft, however, as an ability to influence another by a poem on a certain theme, it follows that the craft requires not only an internal ability, but also the external realization of this ability in the craftsman's work. We obtain, therefore, a new dichotomy: the craft is divided into an ability in the strict sense, viewed as belonging to the craftsman as an inner mental state, and the implementation of this ability in an external object. Neither Cicero nor Philodemus mention this dichotomy; but it fits both the general method and the specific content. If the tripartite division does rest on this dichotomy, there follows another dichotomy: the implementation, or "working" (ἐργασία), is in turn divided into linguistic composition and topic. As we go on, we will find some evidence for these dichotomies.

The similarities between Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* and Neoptolemus' poetics strongly suggest that the latter, too, sprang from the Academy. But if so, we would expect further traces of a continuous tradition of Academic classification. It has been claimed that Cicero's tripartite division of rhetoric is unique in Greek and Roman rhetoric and left no traces in later tradition.⁸¹ There is plenty of evidence, however, that this tripartite division was not an isolated phenomenon. The best place to start looking is Quintilian. Even though he does not mention the tripartite division (although he was of course familiar with Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae*), he shows that there was a swirl of controversy about the classification of rhetoric.

perfect speaker as: "to dispose (διατίθεσθαι) a proposed political inquiry (ζήτημα) as persuasively as possible" (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 2.62). According to Quintilian (3.3.9), Hermagoras included diction under οἰκονομία; the latter presumably falls under διάθεσις. The three basic elements of Hermagoras' definition—disposition, issue, and ability to persuade—agree with the Academic tripartite division. Sulpicius Victor included diction under *dispositio* (see below, n. 98). A scholiast on Aphthonius' *Prog.* (RG 2:1) enumerates thinking (νοῆσαι), inventing proofs, disposing (διαθέσθαι) what is invented, and delivery as the four "tasks of the speaker." Under "disposing," he includes arrangement (τάξις) and "management" (οἰκονομία); presumably he also includes diction.

81. See Sternkopf, *De "Part. Or."* p. 12; and W. Kroll, "Studien über Ciceros Schrift *de oratore*," *RhM* 58 (1903): 552–97, esp. 597.

According to Quintilian, “most and the most eminent authorities” (*plurimi maxime auctores*) divide the art of rhetoric into five “parts”—invention, arrangement, diction, memory, and delivery.⁸² This division is, of course, Peripatetic. In *On Invention* (1.9), Cicero traces it explicitly to Aristotle and notes, like Quintilian, that most people accept it. On the other hand, Quintilian also points out that “not a few” (*non pauci*) regard these five divisions as “tasks” (or “functions,” *opera*, a translation of ἔργα) of the speaker, instead of parts of the art. Quintilian objects that these people “leave nothing to the art,” since the art deals precisely with these tasks.⁸³ Quintilian does not admit either “speech” or “issue” as parts of the art. In his view, a “speech” (*oratio*) is the “work” (*opus*, ἔργον) of the craftsman, just as a statue is the “work” of the sculptor; this work, he explains, is what is achieved by the art.⁸⁴ Philodemus correlates the craftsman with his work in the same way. Quintilian identifies the subject matter of a speech as the “material” (*materies*) of the art; and this, he maintains, underlies all five parts of the art.⁸⁵ Others, he notes, such as Gorgias in Plato’s dialogue, regard the “speech” as the “material” of the craft.⁸⁶ Quintilian himself leaves something to the speaker, after dealing with the craft. His last book concerns the “character” and “tasks” (*opera*) that are required of a speaker in addition to his technical accomplishments. These tasks, which lie outside the craft, include moral goodness (above all else), practice, breadth of knowledge, and other personal choices.⁸⁷

While Quintilian, therefore, identified the craft of rhetoric with the five Peripatetic divisions, others preferred to assign the five divisions to the craftsman. Moreover, although Quintilian might be said to propose a bipartite division between craft and craftsman, as has traditionally been supposed, he treats the craftsman as such (in his capacity as craftsman) as coextensive with the craft, while distinguishing between the craft and the achievements of the person in his non-technical capacity. If we now return to Cicero, we find that something very close to an Academic tripartite division is embedded in his work *On the Orator*. Crassus is called upon to explain what the craft of rhetoric can add to natural talent; and he obliges by summarizing the “commonplace and trite” precepts of the rhetoricians. After defining the “task” (*officium*, a translation of ἔργον) of the speaker as “speaking suitably for persuasion,” he makes a series of distinctions: first, he divides the subject matter of a speech into general and particular issues; next, he divides the “ability of the speaker” (*oratoris vis ac facultas*) into five parts—to invent, arrange, supply diction,

82. 3.3.1.

83. 3.3.11–12, including: “fuerunt etiam in hac opinione non pauci, ut has non rhetorices partes esse existimarent sed opera oratoris.”

84. 2.14.5 and 2.21.1, including: “nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua.”

85. 2.21.4 and 20; and 3.3.14–15. Quintilian (2.21.4–5) cites Socrates in Plato’s *Gorgias*, as well as Cicero, in support of his view that the subject matter is the “material” of the craft.

86. 2.21.1. In his attack on rhetoric, Sext. Emp. (*Math.* 2.48) also takes “speech” (λόγος) as the material (ὑλη) of rhetoric.

87. Quint. 12, intr. 4 and 12.9.1; cf. 12.5.1. See also Book 1, proem 22.

memorize, and deliver; third, he divides the speech into six parts; fourth, he lists four qualities of diction; and he concludes with a brief reference to delivery and memory.⁸⁸

The first three divisions in this list correspond to the three Academic divisions of rhetoric; and the whole is a fusion of Academic and Peripatetic theory. From an Academic analysis, Crassus glides into a Peripatetic scheme by adding Theophrastus' classification of diction, together with a reference to delivery and memory. He equates Peripatetic "invention" with Academic "issue," and Peripatetic "arrangement" with Academic "speech"; then he attaches the three remaining Peripatetic divisions. After this summary of the craft, Crassus makes broad additional demands, particularly for practice and a thorough philosophical and legal education. Like Quintilian, he draws a distinction between technical and non-technical accomplishments.

The author of *Ad Herennium* initially sets out an Academic tripartite division, even though he adopts a Peripatetic organization in the body of his work. After defining the "task of the speaker" (*oratoris officium*) as the ability to speak persuasively about political matters, the author divides the subject matter into three kinds: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic. Next, he lists invention, arrangement, diction, memory, and delivery as "tasks of the speaker." Then he divides the speech (*oratio*) into six parts: exordium, narration, division, proof, refutation, and peroration.⁸⁹ After sketching the parts of a speech, the author explains that he prefers to treat the parts of a speech "in conjunction with the tasks of the speaker" in order to make "learning easier."⁹⁰ He also combines the treatment of the three kinds of cases with the tasks. The result is a Peripatetic division; but the introductory theory is Academic.⁹¹ As Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* amply demonstrates, the ability of the speaker cannot be discussed without reference to the parts of a speech and the type of issue. This overlap leads naturally to the subsumption of the last two divisions within the first—in effect, to a Peripatetic scheme.

Cicero's *On Invention* is thoroughly Peripatetic, but it attests a similar resistance to an Academic organization. After dividing the subject matter, which he calls the "material of the art," into forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, and dividing the art in turn into the five Peripatetic "parts," Cicero implicitly repudiates Academic procedure by stating, analogously to the author of *Ad Herennium*, that in his view the "material" and the "parts" should be treated together.⁹² Quintilian later agrees with this view; both authors indicate that it was controversial.

88. Cicero *De Or.* 1.138–45. In Latin rhetorical writings, *officium* (rather than *opus*) is the preferred translation of ἔργον; see Fortunatianus, *RLM* 81.

89. *Ad Herenn.* 1.2–4.

90. *Ad Herenn.* 1.4: "nunc quoniam una cum oratoris officiis, quo res cognitu facilius esset, producti sumus ut de orationis partibus loqueremur et eas ad inventionis rationem accommodaremus, de exordio primum dicendum videtur."

91. The author finally announces a Peripatetic organization at the beginning of his third book (3.1), after spending the entire first two books on invention in forensic cases.

92. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.9.

These examples show that the Academic classification separates out elements that are combined in the Peripatetic classification. By unpacking concepts that are implicit in the Peripatetic scheme, the Academic analysis constructs a highly sophisticated conceptual framework that draws attention to features and relationships that have not been noticed before. The strength of this conceptualization lies in the fineness and comprehensiveness of the distinctions. An obvious weakness, as it appears from the handbooks, is that it is unwieldy in practice. The whole Academic project may be traced back to Plato's *Gorgias*. As Quintilian points out, Gorgias is pressed by Socrates into agreeing that rhetoric is the ability to persuade "by speech" (διὰ λόγου, or λόγῳ).⁹³ Socrates goes on to show that the definition is incomplete without a specification of the subject matter, that is, justice. The Academic classification separates out the three main elements of this definition. Since it is the task of the speaker to do what he can to persuade, by means of speech, with respect to an issue, the craft of rhetoric has three parts: the ability of the speaker (apart from his actual speech), the speech as the means of persuasion, and the topic as presented in the speech.

The Academic tripartite division of rhetoric survived into late antiquity. After defining the "task" (*officium*) and "goal" (*finis*) of the speaker, Martianus Capella (in the fifth century A.D.) divides the "material" (*materies*) into two kinds: "where" (*ubi*) and "whence" (*unde*) a speech is made. The former consists of the parts of the "issue" (*quaestio*); the latter consists of the combination of invented subject matter (*res inventae*) and words.⁹⁴ Next, Martianus lists the types of "issue" and the five "tasks" of the speaker. There follows a detailed discussion of invention, in which Martianus explicitly includes an analysis of issues. After dealing with the remaining four tasks of the speaker, he concludes with a detailed analysis of the parts of a speech.⁹⁵ This is basically an Academic scheme, which has been modified by the subsumption of the subject matter under invention. Martianus' division of "material" into topic ("where") and the linguistic composite ("whence") is of particular interest because it seems to correspond to the Academic division between issue and speech.

In his fourth-century commentary on Cicero's *On Invention*, Victorinus likewise divides the "material" of the craft into two kinds: "where" (*ubi*) the craft makes something, and "whence" (*unde*) it makes it. Victorinus illustrates the former by the diseases and wounds "in which" the physician works, and the latter by the instruments (*instrumentis*) used by the physician to heal the patient. Analogously, he claims, the art of rhetoric has two kinds of material: deliberation, display, and litigation; and the

93. See *Grg.* 450C–54B. Quint. (2.15.10) presents the Socratic definition as: *vim dicendo persuadendi*. He also assigns a version of Socrates' complete definition to "Theodectes" (who, he says, may be Aristotle): "leading men by speech into that which the speaker wants" ("finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id, quod actor velit").

94. *De rhet.* 5, *RLM* 454.11–16, including: "materies autem duplex est, ubi et unde fiat oratio: ubi [ut] cum ipsius membra adgredior quaestionis; unde, cum res inventae verbaque sociantur."

95. The brevity of Martianus' account of *dispositio* (*De rhet.* 30, *RLM* 471–72) as one of the five "tasks" is compensated by his separate treatment of the parts of a speech (*De rhet.* 44–53, *RLM* 485–91).

"arguments, inquiries, and other necessary materials."⁹⁶ Cicero himself compared the goal of the speaker, that of "persuading by speech" (*persuadere dictione*), to the goal of the physician, "healing by treatment" (*sanare curatione*).⁹⁷ As we saw earlier, authors differed on whether the speech or the subject matter was the "material" of the craft. Martianus and Victorinus indicate that either type of material is further subdivided into what may be called "raw" and crafted material. As instrument or means (*δι' οὗ, ὄργανον*) of the craft, a speech is crafted from arguments and words (*unde*), which are its materials; and the subject matter, or crafted topic, draws on untreated problems as its underlying topic (*ubi*). It was suggested earlier that the entire Academic classification is based on a dichotomy between an inner ability and the external realization of this ability. This realization or "working" (*ἐργασία*), it appears, consists of two kinds of crafted material (*ἔλη*), the means and the topic, each with its own raw materials.

Other Latin rhetorical writers show signs of Academic influence in various degrees.⁹⁸ Just as in the earlier period, Academic influence often seems fused with or submerged in a Peripatetic classification.⁹⁹ It is, indeed, simplistic to treat the Academic and Peripatetic classifications as norms to which rhetorical writers adhered more or less closely. Throughout antiquity, rhetoricians were inventive in devising their own arrangements and classifications; and they borrowed in various degrees from Peripatetics, Academics, Stoics, and others. As has always been recognized, Aristotle was a dominant influence in ancient rhetoric. But it tends to be forgotten that Plato also had a major, indeed guiding, role, not only through his influence on Aristotle, but also directly through his *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* and, not least, through his followers in the Academy.

Whereas the Academic classification of rhetoric can be traced from the first century B.C. to late antiquity, the evidence for Academic influence in poetic theory is much slimmer. Apart from Neoptolemus, there is no sure evidence of anyone adopting a tripartite division of the poetic craft. A fragmentary section of Philodemus' *On Poems* seems to assign a tripartite division to a certain Andromenides, who lived no later than Crates of Mallos (fl. ca. 170 B.C.); but there is no other reference to a tripartite division.¹⁰⁰ This does not mean, however, that there are no traces of Academic

96. *RLM* 174.4–15, including (4–5): "... artis omnem materiam in duobus esse, id est in eo, ubi facit aliquid, et in eo, unde facit." Another illustration is the iron which the blacksmith strikes, and the iron by which he strikes.

97. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.6.

98. Along with Martianus, Sulpicius Victor shows the strongest Academic influence. He lists three "tasks of the speaker" (*officia . . . oratoris*): thought (*intellectio*); invention (*inventio*); and disposition (*dispositio*), under which he includes order (*ordo*), management (*οἰκονομία*), diction, and delivery (*Instit. Or.* 4, *RLM* 315.5–7 and 14, *RLM* 320.11–13). These three tasks correspond roughly to the three requirements that Demetrius of Byzantium made of the poet. After dividing the tasks, Sulpicius analyses the parts of a speech, then deals in detail with the kinds of issue (*Instit. Or.* 16–23 and 24–62, *RLM* 321–25 and 325–52).

99. For example, the Academic notion of "tasks" (*ἔργα*) of the speaker occurs in predominantly Peripatetic accounts; see Fortunatianus (*Ars Rhet.* 1.1, *RLM* 81) and the scholiast on Aphthonius' *Prog.* (n. 80 above).

100. *On Poems*, PHerc. 1073, tr. 2, fr. 25, col. 2.23–27 Sb.; also Jensen, "Philodemus," p. 152. Jensen restored the text heavily, but his supplements are plausible. On the other hand, Jensen's reading of

influence. The trail of testimonies that distinguish between "poem" and *poiesis* points to an Academic classification, just like the numerous traces left in rhetoric. In his *Ars Poetica*, Horace clearly treats the poet as a separate topic, after ranging over aspects of the poetic craft; but this bipartite division is entirely compatible with an Academic tripartite classification of the craft. As we have seen, either an Academic or a Peripatetic analysis of the craft admits of being joined by a section on the nontechnical contribution of the craftsman. The arrangement of Horace's *Ars Poetica* is notoriously difficult to disentangle. But this is just what we would expect from a poet who has taken to heart the injunction to weave a thematic structure without gaps. If Horace did follow Neoptolemus, as Porphyryon says, and if he did make use of Neoptolemus' tripartite division, then, as a poet, he considered it his task to disguise the many cuts of the classification.

If Neoptolemus owed his tripartite division to the Academics and he lived in the third century B.C., then we should expect that Cicero's tripartite division of rhetoric also goes back to the third century B.C. It has been argued in the past that Cicero derived the *Partitiones Oratoriae* from the Academic Philo or Antiochus, both of whom taught Cicero.¹⁰¹ Cicero reports that Philo taught both philosophy and rhetoric,¹⁰² and that he treated not just abstract questions, but particular cases.¹⁰³ It is plausible that Philo or (less likely, in my view) Antiochus is the immediate source of Cicero's work. But if either is responsible, it is also plausible that he was in turn indebted to earlier Academics. The Academics of the preceding generation, including Cleitomachus, Charmadas, and Metrodorus, were keenly interested in rhetoric. They argued vigorously that rhetoric is not a craft or, more precisely, that rhetoric as practiced by the so-called rhetoricians is not a craft.¹⁰⁴ In taking this position, they are following Plato; and they are not denying that rhetoric can be a craft. Cicero mentions that Charmadas maintained that only a rhetoric based on philosophical teachings can be a craft.¹⁰⁵ Cicero also reports that Crassus studied Plato's *Gorgias* closely with Charmadas.¹⁰⁶ Crassus, moreover, studied rhetoric with Metrodorus, whom Cicero calls a "rhetorician from the

the name Crates at line 19 of the same column is very doubtful. One of the few things Philodemus tells about Andromenides is that Crates of Mallos claims to have followed him in every respect (*On Poems* 5, cols. 21.33–22.1). But Philodemus' report about Crates contains no hint of a tripartite division. Rostagni suggests tentatively that the tripartite division may go back to Theophrastus ("Aristotele e l'Aristotelismo nella storia dell'estetica antica," in *Scritti minori*, vol. 1 [Turin, 1955], pp. 76–254, esp. p. 204); cf. Dahmann, "Varros Schrift," pp. 126, 130–33. But there is no shred of evidence for such a division in Theophrastus' extant writings.

101. Hans von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 102–12 proposed that Cicero used Philo in his *De Oratore*; and W. Kroll, "*de Oratore*," n. 81, argued in response that Cicero draws primarily on Antiochus (also "Cicero und die Rhetorik," *Neue Jahrbücher* 6 [1903]: pp. 681–89). In support of Kroll, Paul Sternkopf, "*Part. Or.*," pp. 106–9, argued that Antiochus is the source of Cicero's *Part. Or.*

102. *Tusc.* 2.9.

103. *De Or.* 3. 110.

104. Cic. *De Or.* 1.45–47, 84, 89–93; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 2.20.

105. *De Or.* 1.84, 93.

106. *De Or.* 1.47.

Academy.”¹⁰⁷ It was customary for the Academics to argue on either side of a question; and it was also customary for them to base their arguments on comprehensive classifications, which incorporated the views of their opponents. It is to be expected that in their arguments on rhetoric, whether for or against, they provided an initial analysis of rhetoric as a craft and then proceeded to show whether rhetoric satisfied these criteria or not.

If we push back another generation, we find that Carneades (214/3–129/8 B.C.) drew up an extensive classification of the ethical craft, or “art of life.”¹⁰⁸ Antiochus later used this classification.¹⁰⁹ The preserved details show that Carneades made careful distinctions about the goal and the material of the craft, but they do not point specifically to a tripartite division. Carneades also argued at length that divination was not a craft. His attack, as preserved by Cicero, is divided into a section showing that divination has no subject matter (or “topic”), and a section showing that it has no method; each section contains numerous subdivisions.¹¹⁰ Cicero also reports that the Academics set out an “art” about presentations, with numerous divisions, including sections on perception and on reason.¹¹¹ Sextus Empiricus shows that Carneades is chiefly responsible for this analysis. According to Sextus, Carneades dealt exhaustively with the criteria of truth, arguing that none of the alleged criteria—reason, perception, presentation, or anything else—is a criterion.¹¹²

This still leaves us short of Neoptolemus’ presumed lifetime. We know virtually nothing about the Academy between Arcesilaos (316–242 B.C.) and Carneades; and nothing we know about Arcesilaos pertains to the classification of rhetoric or poetry. The dearth of evidence might well prompt a retreat, were it not for the fact that Neoptolemus did propose a tripartite classification that agrees with later Academic classifications. It is vastly more likely that Neoptolemus derived his classification from the Academy, whose philosophers were in the habit of producing elaborate classifications of crafts, than that the Academy derived theirs from him. Hence, even though we lack any direct evidence of a tie between Neoptolemus and the Academy, there is good reason to attach Neoptolemus’ poetics to a continuous Academic tradition of classification. This tradition derives methodological principles as well as substantive proposals from Plato, while continually gathering new material from philosophers of various persuasions. Just as Cicero gathered

107. *De Or.* 3.75.

108. *Cic. Fin.* 5.16–21.

109. *Cic. Fin.* 5.16.

110. *Cic. Div.* 2.9–25 on subject matter; and 2.26–150 on methods.

111. *Cic. Acad.* 2.40–42; *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.159–89.

112. See esp. *Math.* 7.159. Sextus (*Pyr.* 2.21; *Math.* 7.35–37, 261–62) also divides the criteria of truth into three kinds, ὑφ’ οὗ (“agent”), δι’ οὗ (“instrument”), and καθ’ ὃ (“according to which”). Even though Aenesidemus may be Sextus’ immediate source, it is noticeable that the division agrees with the Academic division of rhetoric into speaker (the agent), speech (the means), and issue (that is, “in accordance with which” the speaker persuades), and the corresponding division of poetry. It is possible that Carneades was responsible for the tripartite division of the criteria of truth, viewed as divisions of the art of judging the truth.

much Peripatetic and Stoic material into a framework inspired by Plato, so Neoptolemus' classification of poetry could accommodate Peripatetic and Stoic material. Horace's obvious debt to Aristotle in the *Ars Poetica* does not diminish the possibility that his primary source was a work that sprang from the Academy.

Whatever the history of Neoptolemus' classification, it is certainly not a piece of lunacy, as Philodemus' outspoken attack might make it appear. In modern terminology, Neoptolemus divided the art of poetry into author, medium, and message. This analysis did not pass on to the moderns from the ancients. But, to judge by modern discussions, it is an immensely fruitful way of looking at the arts. As Neoptolemus proposes, the artist's intent is one type of art, not the whole of it, as Croce and Collingwood would have us believe. Similarly, the physical product is part of the art, and so is the message. Neoptolemus proposes a hermeneutic arc that extends from author to work of art and to the listener. As Philodemus believes, this is an overly subtle analysis that infringes common sense and, specifically, separates out elements that must remain combined. The issue between Neoptolemus and Philodemus has persisted, along with Neoptolemus' distinctions. Philodemus takes a stand with common sense against critical theory, and he defends the unity of a work of art against the attempt to tease out different strands.

Earlier, we left some unanswered questions about Philodemus' criticisms of Neoptolemus. For Philodemus immediately jumped into making corrections, without giving us much of a clue about what Neoptolemus himself meant. Among Philodemus' corrections is an apparently unassailable proposal: the name "poet" should have been given to "the person who has the ability and works from it." The suggestion, it turns out, is not acceptable, because what Neoptolemus meant by "poet" is "ability of the poet"; and this can be a "species" of the craft, whereas the person (in the strict sense) cannot be.

Further, Philodemus proposed that Neoptolemus should have called the dispositions (διαθέσεις) *poieseis*, or better, that he should have called the poems "works" (ἔργα) and the *poieseis* "something like weavings." "Disposition" is a name that fits Neoptolemus' category of "poem." Philodemus, it seems, suggests that Neoptolemus should have applied the term "dispositions" to *poieseis* instead of "poems." Philodemus' reason is presumably that a *poiesis* has a more complex arrangement than most "poems."

Since "weaving" is applicable to Neoptolemus' category of *poiesis*, Philodemus does not so much correct Neoptolemus here as retract his own proposal to apply the term "dispositions" to *poieseis*. Philodemus now proposes to eliminate the term "dispositions" altogether in favor of the comparison of *poieseis* to "weavings"; and he suggests a new term for "poem"—"work." Philodemus' identification of poems with "works" looks like ordinary commonsense; but, as we have seen, it was a matter of controversy. In Neoptolemus' classification, poems and *poieseis* are

equally “works,” and both are subdivisions of the craft. Moreover, the term ἔργον also applies to Neoptolemus’ remaining subdivision, the poet; for it signifies the “task,” or function, of the poet no less than the poet’s product. Neoptolemus’ terminology reflects a novel analysis of art, according to which an art consists of both the ability of the artist and the art work.¹¹³

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113. I am much indebted to D. Konstan for his excellent suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.